The most likely outcome of this buildup with Russia
With each passing day the situation with Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and the United States grows more high stakes and more complex. There’s a chance that this could end up going very badly. But we should keep in mind that the most likely outcome in all this is… nothing.
I can hear some of you already saying it: “You’re telling us not to lose sleep over the threat of World War III. Not very vigilant of you, Palmer!” But that’s not what I’m saying at all. Even if the odds of imminent world war are 1% or 0.1%, that should still be enough to greatly concern you. And it’s unlikely that the percentage is much higher than that.
Keep in mind that this current ramping up began after the people of Kazakhstan tried to overthrow their Putin-aligned government a few weeks ago. Succeed or fail, this sent a clear signal that Putin was vulnerable. In order to distract from that, Putin began acting like he’s going to do the one thing that he’s spent the past several years showing the world he’s not capable of pulling off: invading the rest of Ukraine.
If Putin has spent the past several years not being capable of seizing the rest of Ukraine, why would he suddenly be capable of pulling it off now? Logically, he wouldn’t. But his buildup sure has gotten the world to stop talking about whether he’s weak enough to lose influence in Kazakhstan or other various nations, and instead has the entire world talking about whether he’s strong enough to take the rest of Ukraine or win a war against Europe.
One of the reasons Putin has survived all these years is that he’s skilled at flipping the narrative like this. Now he’s doing it again. In one sense he’s already won this battle, simply because he’s got everyone scared of him again. Much as he’d very much love to take over the rest of Ukraine, you have to ask yourself why Putin would suddenly think that attempting it is a worthwhile risk, after he spent the past several years reluctantly deciding not to attempt it.
Does Putin think he’s in that much of a stronger position than he was previously? That’s difficult to imagine. Seemingly the only thing that could drive Putin to finally try taking the rest of Ukraine would be if he’s worried that his position is weakening so badly, he could get overthrown if he doesn’t try something rash. But if Putin thinks he can get what he needs out of this “crisis” simply by acting like he’s going to take the rest of Ukraine, and doesn’t have to risk prompting a response from the West that could weaken him, why would he bother?
In fact, shortly after Putin lost his puppet in the White House, he responded by – sound familiar? – building up his forces as if he were going to try to take the rest of Ukraine. After a stalemate with Europe and Biden, Putin ultimately made up an excuse to tamp down his forces, while creating enough of a distraction so no one would notice he was backing down. It’s just what he does.
Of course this can all change. And we’ve all read about wars that got started unintentionally when no side actually wanted a war, and all sides were just posturing. But keep in mind that Putin answers to the Russian oligarch billionaires. Without their support, he wouldn’t last five minutes. They’ve already been hit hard by economic sanctions that resulted from Putin’s pointless murder of Magnitsky, Putin’s ultimately failed Trump experiment, and so on. If anything, war would only result in far more crushing sanctions against Russia – something that the oligarchs would never stand for unless Putin could convince them that they’d gain more money from war than they’d lose from additional sanctions.
In the end it all comes down to whether Vladimir Putin wants to risk his career, his money, and his life by starting the kind of war that he’s spent the past several years showing us he isn’t sure he can win. It’s possible. But that would require Putin going from a decades-long pragmatic villain who only picks fights he thinks he’s overwhelmingly likely to win, and instead transforming into the kind of unstable villain who’s willing to bet everything he has on an unknown.
Again, even very small odds of imminent war with Russia should be enough to keep you vaguely up at night. But the notion that war is a done deal, or likely, or anything bigger than remote, comes across as doomsday hysteria. Keep in mind that pundits get booked on cable news by “sounding the alarm” about things, which usually involves taking a highly unlikely doomsday outcome and portraying it as if it’s highly likely to happen. After all, no cable news network can keep you tuned in by admitting that the current doomsday scenario is probably going to turn out to be nothing.
For that matter, the media and the pundits all know that if they hyperbolically insist that a highly unlikely doomsday scenario is definitely going to happen, they’ll pay no price for being proven wrong on this – even if their entire career consists of nothing but being proven wrong on doomsday predictions. And on the flipside, because I’m honestly admitting that the Russia situation will probably go nowhere, imagine how much blowback I’ll face in the highly unlikely event that something terrible does happen with Russia.
If you the audience want more honest and accurate punditry, you’re going to have to start grading the pundits more appropriately. Keep track of which talking heads always insist that this or that situation has us on the verge of total doom, and are always proven wrong. Keep track of which pundits are willing to admit that this or that situation is unlikely to go anywhere, and are generally proven correct about it. The pundits will always go where the praise is, and never where the career risk is. It’s your job to assign the praise and the risk accordingly.
